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TEED OFF ABOUT PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION ON
THE TAXPAYER'S DIME: TAX EXEMPTIONS AND OTHER
GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGES TO DISCRIMINATORY
PRIVATE CLUBS
JENNIFER JOLLY-RYAN*
INTRODUCTION
Discrimination by bona fide private clubs is legal. It is a consti-
tutionally protected activity under the First Amendment.1 In balancing
individuals' freedom of association with civil rights laws, Congress
specifically exempts private clubs from protections otherwise afforded
to certain protected classes.2 Laws in the United States, however, go
further than balancing and protecting the associational rights of
private club members, and this article analyzes and critiques these
additional protections. Discrimination by private clubs, which would
be unlawful but for the private clubs' exemption from civil rights laws,
is often subsidized through government-authorized tax exemptions.
Most private clubs are nonprofit and therefore exempt from paying
federal income taxes.3 Private clubs may also be exempt from state
franchise taxes paid on income. Many private clubs also receive sub-
stantial property tax exemptions from significant real estate holdings.5
Tax exemptions to private clubs that discriminate on the basis of race,
gender, and religion are at the expense of the very citizens victimized
by discrimination, citizens who oppose discrimination, and taxpayers
who protest, "not on my dime!"
* Professor of Legal Writing, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University. The author thanks her research assistant, Kristin Messer, for her help on
this article and Christine Lawhorn for her secretarial assistance. The author also thanks
Dean Gerry St. Amand of Salmon P. Chase College of Law for supporting her legal
writing and scholarship.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... abridging... the
right of the people peaceably to assemble .. "). Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2006) (exempting "a private club or other establishment not
in fact open to the public" from the antidiscrimination laws in 42 U.S.C.). Id.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) (2006) exempts nonprofit clubs from paying income taxes;
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(8) (2006) exempts fraternal orders from paying income taxes. See
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that Congress did not
violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act by exempting nonprofit clubs from paying income taxes,
although some of the clubs excluded nonwhites from membership).
4. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010 (10) (j) (West 2006).
5. Scott R. Rosner, Reflections on Augusta: Judicial, Legislative and Economic
Approaches to Private Race and Gender Consciousness, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 135,
177 (2003) (advocating combating private club discrimination by denying property
tax exemptions).
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Heeding the protests of taxpayers and civil rights groups who do
not want to foot the bill for discrimination, some state legislators have
enacted statutes disallowing tax benefits to those private clubs that
discriminate on the basis of certain protected classifications.6 However,
statutes prohibiting tax benefits to discriminatory clubs may often be
difficult to enforce and administer. After enacting such a law, the fol-
lowing questions arise: (1) who will be responsible for determining
whether a private club discriminates? (2) what kind of proof should
be used to demonstrate that a private club discriminates on the basis
of race, gender, or religion and is, therefore, not entitled to tax ex-
emptions? (3) should the government bear the burden of proving dis-
crimination, or should the entity claiming the benefit or privilege show
that it does not discriminate? This article explores these questions.
After briefly addressing the background of discrimination at private
clubs, the associational rights of club members, and the implications
of civil rights laws, this article offers solutions to aid in the enforce-
ment and administration of legislation designed to eliminate govern-
ment subsidies for discrimination through United States tax laws.
Many private clubs do not discriminate on the basis of otherwise
protected classifications of individuals. Furthermore, many types of
discrimination are lawful. This article does not question associational
rights of bona fide private clubs, even in situations where those rights
result in discriminatory membership practices. The constitutional
rights of bona fide private clubs are well established.7 It does not
follow, however, that private clubs that discriminate on the basis of
race, gender, or religion should be subsidized through tax exemptions,
liquor licenses, or other government benefits and privileges.
I. PRIVATE CLUBS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS ON THE
BASIS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION. SO WHAT'S THE
PROBLEM?
A private club, by its very nature, discriminates. It is selective
about who can and can not be a member. Some private clubs may
admit only members who meet certain income criteria. Some private
clubs may admit only members with a certain pedigree. Other pri-
vate clubs may admit only members from certain geographic areas.
Still others outwardly discriminate on the basis of race, gender, and
religion.' Although many private clubs do not discriminate against
6. See infra notes 164-91.
7. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,655-56 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts
is an "expressive association" that can exclude homosexual scoutmasters if including
them would "significantly affect its expression").
8. Thomas H. Sawyer, Private Golf Clubs: Freedom of Expression and the Right to
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individuals belonging to a protected class under civil rights laws,
others do openly discriminate. The press has widely reported selective
activities affecting individuals who would otherwise be protected by
civil rights laws.9
Racial discrimination at private club golf courses drew the
attention of the press in 1990.10 In that year, Shoal Creek Country
Club in Birmingham, Alabama was scheduled to host the nationally
prestigious PGA Championship. " When asked about its policy of ex-
cluding African Americans as members, the president and founder of
the club responded that it was unheard of to allow African Americans
into the club. 2 He explained, "[t]hat's just not done in Birmingham."'3
Faced with threats of boycotts by the public and, most importantly,
television sponsors, Shoal Creek admitted its first African American
member. 4 Many other host clubs for PGA tournaments, however,
refused to change their discriminatory policies despite a new require-
ment imposed by the PGA Tour, the United States Golf Association,
and the Ladies PGA Tour that clubs hosting tournaments allow
minority members. 5
Most private country clubs started as Protestant enclaves, exclud-
ing Catholics and Jews.16 Although the stigma against Catholics has
faded, some private clubs continue to deny membership to Jews, even
Privacy, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 187, 202-03 (1993) (noting that the "concept of inherent
racial, religious, or gender inequality survives in the bylaws and admission policies of
private clubs which can reject a black, Jew or female applicant with no more justification
than 'no __ allowed"').
9. See, e.g., Marcia Chambers, At Country Clubs, Gay Members Seek Privileges for
Their Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,2004, at D2; Clifton Brown, Augusta Marches On,
With Its Rules Intact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at Si; Alex Kuczynski, It's Still a
Man's, Man's, Man's World, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at H1.
10. P.G.A. Site Bars Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at B9.
11. Id.
12. Frank J. Ferraro, Prerogative or Prejudice?: The Exclusion of Women From
Augusta National, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 39 (2003).
13. Id. at 39-40 (quoting Kenneth L. Shropshire, Private Race Consciousness, 1996
DET. C.L. REv. 629, 634).
14. Sam Lacy, P.GA Must Go Beyond Token Change, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,1990, at S8.
15. William A. Henry III, The Last Bastions of Bigotry: A Year after the P.G.A. Banned
Discrimination on the Tour, Private Golf Clubs Have Made, at Most, Token Changes,
TIME, July 22, 1991, at 66; see also Adair Lara, The Chosen Few; S.F. 's Exclusive Clubs
Carry on Traditions of Fellowship, Culture, and Discrimination, S.F. CHRON., July 19,
2004, at Al (noting that in the San Francisco area, the San Francisco Golf Club lost its role
as host for PGA events because it had no minority members. Another golf club, Cypress
Point, withdrew from the AT&T Pebble Beach Tournament rather than admit minorities).
16. David M. Halbfinger, Public and Private Distinctions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003,
at $1; see also Frank Whalen, Few Minorities at Country Clubs, ALLENTOWN MORNING
CALL, June 5,1997, at D1. Reportedly, Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg challenged
President Kennedy for his membership in the Links Country Club because it excluded
Jews. President Kennedy supposedly answered with a chuckle, "Hell, Arthur... they don't
even allow Catholics." Id.
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in areas of the country with substantial Jewish populations."7 At one
point, over two hundred Jewish families had homes that abutted a
private golf club in Florida, yet none of the families were members
of the prestigious club.'" Many clubs may not admit to discrimina-
tory membership policies and instead use less openly discrimina-
tory methods to prevent minorities from acquiring membership.' 9
For example, Jewish applicants often may have difficulty finding
the requisite number of member sponsors to be admitted to a club.2 °
In addition to excluding on the basis of religion, private country
club golf courses also have a rich history of excluding women from
membership.2 ' For example, the Chicago area reportedly has at
least four male-only golf clubs.22 As of July 2004, the San Francisco
Chronicle reported that San Francisco's golf clubs carried on a tra-
dition of discrimination, noting that out of
the big four... the Bohemian Club, the stodgy Pacific-Union Club
atop Nob Hill, the gigantic sports-minded Olympic Club, and the
tiny ultra-exclusive San Francisco Golf Club .... [only] [t]wo admit
women. Two do not. One admits women in town, but not in the
country - and not after dark.... None admits the poor, except
in white jackets.2"
Augusta National Country Club is perhaps the most publicized
club that discriminates against women.2 4 One of the most pres-
tigious and anticipated professional golf tournaments in the world,
the Masters Golf Tournament, is held annually at the Augusta
National Golf Club.2" Competitors and spectators flock from around
the world to be part of the event,26 yet Augusta National Golf Club,
17. Commenting on how persnickety one San Francisco club can be, one club
member noted that "It] hey don't take Jewish people, which is outrageous." Adair Lara,
The Chosen Few; S.F.'s Exclusive Clubs Carry on Traditions of Fellowship, Culture -
and Discrimination, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 2004, at Al (quoting San Francisco architect
George Livermore).
18. John Murawski, Club Fights Claims That It Does Not Admit Jews, PALM BEACH
POST, Apr. 30, 2001, at IA.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Keith Jones, Northern's Exposure All Male Clubs and the United States
Supreme Court, 18 DUPAGE CO. BAR ASS'N BRIEF, Sept. 2005, at 19.
22. Id.
23. Adair Lara, The Chosen Few; S.F.'s Exclusive Clubs Carry on Traditions of
Fellowship, Culture - and Discrimination, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 2004, at Al.
24. Ferraro, supra note 12, at 40.
25. Marcia Chambers, Augusta's Money Matters, GOLF FOR WOMEN MAG., May/June
2003, available at http://www.golfdigest.com/gfw/gfwfeaturestindex.ssf.7/gfw/ gfwfeatures/
gfw200306augustamoney.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
26. Id.
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rather than the Masters Tournament, has become the focus of media
and activist discontent over recent years. 27 From major television net-
works to senators and national feminist organizations, a heated debate
continues to brew over Augusta National's policy to exclude women
from club membership.28 Only men can be members of the club.29 It is
estimated that more than three hundred men are on the waiting list
to become members of Augusta National, and they can only become
members if recommended by current members.3 0 The membership
of Augusta National represents "the old guard of American wealth and
power," men who have acquired wealth through "banking and finance,
oil and gas, manufacturing, and distributing."'"
Despite the gender discriminatory policy of Augusta National, the
Masters continues to flourish as one of the most important profes-
sional golf tournaments in the United States.32 Tiger Woods, currently
the top-ranked golfer in the world, won the 2005 tournament, and Phil
Mickelson, another top-ranked golfer, won the coveted green jacket
in 2006."' The 2007 spring tournament looms just around the corner.'
Although many corporations refused to sponsor the 2003 and 2004
Masters, the media and the sponsors returned in droves in 2005.35 Not
a single player heeded the calls of the National Council of Women's
Organizations (NCWO) to boycott a tournament run by a discrimi-
natory golf club.36
Augusta National Golf Club's record for admitting African
Americans is not much better than its record for admitting women
27. Id.
28. Id.; see S. Res. 413, 2003 Leg. (Ga. 2003) (noting that the purpose of the reso-
lution is to "express] opposition to gender discrimination and urg[e] the Augusta National
Golf Club to review and to reverse its discriminatory policy of excluding women from
its membership").
29. A woman may play golf at Augusta only if she is a guest of a member. Ferraro,
supra note 13, at 40.
30. Id. at 42.
31. Id. Examples of some of the most preeminent members of Augusta include:
"Warren Buffet, Arnold Palmer, former Secretary of State George Shultz, Kenneth
Chenault, chairman and CEO of American Express, Lou Holtz" and Bill Gates. Id.
32. Id. at 39.
33. David Westin, Mickelson Makes Second Major in A Row, AUGUSTA CHRON., Apr.
10, 2006, at M1; Official World Golf Ranking (Oct. 15, 2006), http://www.owgr.com
rankings/default.sps.
34. The 2007 Masters Tournament is scheduled for April 2-8. The Official Site of the
Masters Tournament, Today at the Masters, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.masters.org/en
_US/news/articles/2005-08-16/200508161140642361860.html.
35. Damon Hack, What's Missing at Augusta? Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,2005,
at D1.
36. Charles P. Charpentier, Comment, An Unimproved Lie: Gender Discrimination
Continues at Augusta National Golf Club, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J., 111, 112 (2004);
Damon Hack, Lawmakers Take Aim at Augusta, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at D5.
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as members. As one author described, "[f]rom its inception until 1975,
the only African Americans allowed into Augusta National were
those who worked as kitchen staff."7 The club did not allow African
Americans to work on the golf course until 1975.38 Augusta National
admitted its first African-American club member in 1990, largely in
response to the bad press that Birmingham's Shoal Creek Country
Club received in excluding African Americans.3 9 By 2003, however,
only two to four out of a total of three hundred members of Augusta
National Golf Club were African Americans.4 °
Despite its history, Augusta National remains untouched by legal
sanctions.41 Unlike many private clubs, Augusta National does not
take tax exemptions.42 The club claims that the Masters Tournament
is a completely separate entity from the activities of the private mem-
bership club.43 Regardless of these claims, the Masters may actually
be a for-profit multi-million dollar business that funds many of the
activities of Augusta National's dues-paying members." Although
the active campaign against Augusta National that roared in 2002
and 2003 is now barely smoldering, two members of Congress, Carolyn
Mahoney (NY) and Brad Sherman (CA), recently took aim at the dis-
criminatory practices of the club.45 The bill that the members drafted
would require Augusta National to print receipts stating that the
transaction is not tax deductible, thus prohibiting companies from
deducting activities they hold at the club.46
Although Augusta National and its policy of excluding women has
been a media target, it is not the sole male-only private golf club in the
country. In the spring of 2003, Golf Digest reported that "twenty-four
men-only private golf clubs continue to prohibit women from obtain-
ing memberships."4 Many more private golf clubs deny benefits and
privileges to women members, even if they choose to admit women.4"
37. Ferraro, supra note 12, at 40.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Chambers, supra note 25, at 111.
42. Id. at 110.
43. Id. at 109.
44. Id. at 110.
45. Damon Hack, Lawmakers Take Aim at Augusta, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,2005, at D5.
46. Ending Tax Breaks for Discrimination Act of 2005, H.R. 1521, 109th Cong. § 2(a)
(2005). As of the writing of this article, the Maloney-Sherman bill is under review by the
House Ways and Means Committee.
47. Charpentier, supra note 36, at 128. The author notes that several of these private
golf clubs allow the wives of members to play during the week, but they preserve coveted
weekend and holiday tee times for the male members. Id. at 129.
48. Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Chipping Away at Discrimination at the Country Club, 25
PEPP. L. REV. 495, 496 (1997).
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Despite the fact that several clubs may have revamped their official
policies in order to allow women to utilize club facilities, women may
not get to play golf when they want to play.49 A club membership
'doesn't mean ... that she gets to play on Saturday morning."5°
Clubs typically reserve tee times on a particular weekday for women,
while maintaining Saturdays for men "who presumably maintain
work schedules that do not permit them to play during the week,
unlike their wives.
Some people see no problem with that. In the words of a male
golfer and club member, "[w]omen are welcome as guests, they may
play anytime they like, they have a lovely changing room, but the club
is for men. What could possibly be wrong with that?
52
So what is all the fuss about? While private clubs do have the
right to determine club membership, people of all varieties need to be
afforded the opportunities provided by private club membership.5"
Membership in private clubs is an important source for business op-
portunities, including developing business contacts, networking, and
gaining new clients.' The most powerful executives, CEOs, and poli-
ticians in the United States play golf at private club golf courses and
bring their clients.5' Executives from "IBM, AT&T, Motorola, General
Electric, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, NationsBank, and Berkshire
Hathaway" play golf at Augusta National Golf Course.5" George W.
Bush, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, George
Schultz, Alexander Haig, and Colin Powell are reportedly members
of the prestigious Bohemian Club near San Francisco.5 Approxi-
mately three thousand people are on the waiting list to join the
49. Id.
50. Tim Stephens, Women Golfers Slowly But Surely Chip at Barriers, ROCKY MT.
NEWS, Feb. 18, 1996, at 10B (quoting Marcia Chambers, contributing editor for Golf
Digest and author of THE UNPLAYABLE LIE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WOMEN AND
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN GOLF (1995)).
51. Jolly-Ryan, supra note 48, at 496.
52. Charpentier, supra note 36, at 111 (citing Ian Brooks, "a member of the Honorable
Company of Edinburgh Golfers," as reported by Michael Bamberger in She Means
Business: A Letter Asking Augusta National to Admit Women Set Off the Boss of the
Masters, and a Firestorm that Continues to Burn, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 29, 2002,
P1, 2002 WL 24262648).
53. Cynthia A. Leiferman, Private Clubs: A Sanctuary for Discrimination? 40 BAYLOR
L. REV. 71, 95 (1988) (noting that excluding members of protected classes "is detri-
mental to the goal of removing racial discrimination from society").
54. See id. at 102-03.
55. See Carolyn M. Janiak, The "Links" Among Golf, Networking, and Women's
Professional Advancement, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 317, 332-33 (2003); see also MARCIA
CHAMBERS, THE UNPLAYABLE LIE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WOMEN AND DISCRIMINATION
IN AMERICAN GOLF 31 (1995).
56. Id.
57. Lara, supra note 15.
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exclusive club, which has a fifteen to twenty year waiting list."8 Marcia
Chambers explains the importance of golf as a networking tool in
business and law and how the gender "grass ceiling" at private clubs
serves as a barrier to their advancement.59 Golf has become so es-
sential in the business world that some might argue it "has replaced
the three-martini lunch as the preferred vehicle for sealing deals.""°
The lack of networking opportunities for women and minorities
detrimentally affects careers. Women and minorities often have a dif-
ficult time climbing the corporate ladder or gaining partnership in law
firms.6 These difficulties may be at least partially attributable to
women's and minorities' limited networking opportunities, which are
primarily available at such places as golf courses and country clubs.62
One commentator has noted that
exclusion from such informal centers of power reinforces the per-
ception that women [or minorities] are not appropriate participants
where formal power is exercised. When doctors, lawyers, judges,
politicians, and corporate executives unabashedly practice discrimi-
nation as members of discriminatory clubs, there exists an implied
sanction of discrimination in society generally. Furthermore, a
serious injustice is inflicted upon the younger generation of the
exclusive majority by molding their attitudes toward acceptance
of discriminatory policies.63
An even more serious result of discriminatory membership practices
is that they reinforce perceptions that women and minorities do not
belong in "the higher ranks of government, the professions, or the
corporate world."64
II. BALANCING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AFFECT-
ING PRIVATE CLUBS; ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOMS AND THE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS EXEMPTION
Despite the negative effects of an exclusive networking environ-
ment, the United States Constitution protects its citizens' privacy of
58. Id.
59. CHAMBERS, supra note 55, at 42-53.
60. Janiak, supra note 55, at 329 (quoting Mark Nelson, Golf and Business: A Perfect
Couple, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, (Nov. 8, 2001) at http://www.businessweek.com/
lifestyle/content/nov200l/ls2001116_3182.htm).
61. Id. at 327-28.
62. Id. at 332-36.
63. M. Burns, The Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner
Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 333 (1983); see
also Janiak, supra note 55.
64. Burns, supra note 63, at 333.
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personal association.6" Citizens of the United States value their
rights of intimate and expressive association, which give them the
freedom to associate with persons of their choice, without government
intervention or interference. 6 Most pertinent to private clubs, the
United States Supreme Court has pronounced that there is "no clearer
example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members
it does not desire."67 While the government has a compelling inter-
est in eradicating discrimination, the courts must balance individ-
ual rights of association with discrimination laws, beginning with
an analysis of the strength of the associational right implicated."
Congress exempts a private club from the public accommodations
provision of the civil rights law, as long as it qualifies for protected
associational rights.69
A. Private Clubs' Constitutional Rights to Discriminate:
Associational Freedoms
Possible associational freedoms of private clubs fall into two
categories. First, members of private clubs may have the protected
freedom of expressive association.v Second, members of private clubs
may have the protected freedom of intimate association.71
1. Expressive Association
Citizens of the United States have the protected right of free-
dom of expressive association to "associate for the purpose of engag-
ing in those activities protected by the First Amendment - speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion."7 2 The right of freedom of expressive association is most
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
66. Roberts v. U. S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (acknowledging that there is
a "right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of... social ... and cultural
ends").
67. Id. at 623; see also Kenneth L. Shropshire, Private Race Consciousness, 1996 DET.
C.L. REV. 629, 639.
68. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that
the governmental interest in ending racial discrimination in schools "outweighs wha-
tever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious
beliefs"). Id.
69. For a discussion of the associational rights paired with private clubs, see supra
notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
70. Beth Parker, Membership has its Privileges: Defiant Private Clubs are Testing
the Boundaries of Associational Rights, 8 CAL. LAWYER, June 1988, at 46, 49-50.
71. Id. at 49.
72. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
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fundamental to our Constitution and receives the highest degree of
protection.7" Freedom of expressive association is an "indispensable
means of preserving" First Amendment rights and other fundamental
liberties.74 This most fundamental freedom of expressive association
is seldom implicated in the controversy over discrimination at a private
club golf course or social country club, as usually the purpose of join-
ing these organizations is for recreation, sport, or social opportunities,
rather than for engaging in free speech or expression.75
2. Intimate Association
Citizens of the United States also have the freedom of intimate
association.76 They have the constitutional right to "enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships" that are "secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such rela-
tionships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme."7 The freedom of intimate association is im-
plicated when balancing civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination
against the selective practices of private clubs.7"
The Constitution only protects those interpersonal relationships
that qualify as "intimate associations."79 The most intimate relation-
ships involve family, such as marriage, childbirth, child-rearing and
education, and cohabitation with relatives.' In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
the Supreme Court determined that "[f] amily relationships, by their
nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessary
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special com-
munity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life."'" At the other end of the constitutional
spectrum, impersonal relationships are not protected. 2 For example,
the First Amendment does not shield the typical relationships found
in large corporations and those between employers and employees
from government intervention and interference.83
The United States Supreme Court has nonetheless made clear
that some relationships outside of the family may qualify as intimate
73. See id.
74. Id.; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
75. See Parker, supra note 70, at 50.
76. See id. at 49.
77. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
78. Parker, supra note 70, at 49.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
81. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20.
82. Id. at 620.
83. Id.
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associations.8 4 The Supreme Court's more expansive view of what
constitutes an intimate association is important when considering
a First Amendment challenge by a private club. Declining to iden-
tify every type of relationship that will be protected by the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that
certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmit-
ting shared ideas and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act
as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State... [T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships
reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emo-
tional enrichment from close ties with others.85
Many relationships fall between the heightened constitutional
protections for the most intimate of relationships and absence of pro-
tections for impersonal relationships.' Some relationships developed
at private country clubs or golf course clubs may fall within this "in be-
tween" category. Many personal relationships, such as friendships
and other personal bonds, develop between members as a result of
membership in private clubs.8 The membership of many selective
clubs is homogeneous, with members often sharing common ideas and
beliefs.89 The close relationships formed in these organizations may
be constitutionally protected.9"
In determining the level of intimacy of a relationship, the court en-
gages in "a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments."91 In the case of a private
club asserting First Amendment rights of intimate personal asso-
ciations, the court will scrutinize a number of characteristics of an
ostensibly private club, including "size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics."92 It will consider how many
members belong to the club and whether there is a numerical limit on
club membership.93 The larger the club, the less likely it is private and
84. See id.
85. Id. at 618-19.
86. Id. at 620.
87. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
88. Id. at 619-20.
89. Id. at 620.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 801 (E.D. Penn. 1989)
(noting a lack of selectivity when the club allowed 500 persons to buy shares and did not
cap the number of associates admitted to the club); Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country
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the less likely club members share the necessary close ties to estab-
lish an intimate association.
9 4
A court will scrutinize a club's purpose if its goal is to make a
profit or to provide substantial economic opportunities for its members,
purposes that are not protected by associational rights. 5 A profit-
making purpose is indicative of a relationship between club members
more akin to an impersonal business relationship, which is not con-
stitutionally protected.96
Courts will also consider whether a club has gone to the trouble
of formalizing itself through articles or bylaws, formal expulsion and
admission procedures, a membership roster, and membership cards.97
Additionally, they will consider whether the club holds formal meet-
ings. 8 If, however, the members of the club do not hold meetings, then
the court will find it difficult to find a protected association. 99
Furthermore, courts will also consider whether a club has for-
malized admissions policies and whether those policies indeed pro-
mote the private nature of the club.' 00 For example, if a club has an
admission policy to conduct no investigation of potential members and
is not selective in admitting members, then the club is likely not a
bona fide private club.' 01 In order to determine if a club is truly pri-
vate, courts will scrutinize whether a club is genuinely selective in the
admission of its members. 02 Courts will also consider other factors,
Club, Inc. 573 F. Supp. 399, 403 (E.D. Va. 1983) (noting the relevance of the number of
white applicants); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375 (E.D. La. 1969) (mea-
suring selectivity in part by "[w]hether the number of members is limited in any way
other than by the capacity of the facilities"). Id.
94. See Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968)
(holding that the Raleigh Y.M.C.A. was not a private club, in part because the club had
a large membership and did not apply any criteria to acquire membership, except by
excluding African-American applicants).
95. Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that
a subdivision club was not private in part because the club largely functioned to com-
mercially benefit the subdivision developer).
96. See, e.g., id.
97. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 376.
98. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Nesmith, 397
F.2d at 101 (noting that there is no "private association [if] the members do not meet
together"') (citing Robert L. Thompson, Note, Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Public
Accommodations - Private Club Exemption, 45 N.C. L.Rev. 498, 505 (1967)).
99. Id.
100. See United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 797 (E.D. Penn.
1989); Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 403 (E.D. Va.
1983); Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968).
101. Nesmith, 397 F.2d at 102.
102. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 796; Durham v. Red Lake Fishing &
Hunting Club, 666 F. Supp. 954, 960 (W.D. Tex. 1987); Loudoun Golf & Country Club,
573 F. Supp. at 402-03; United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles, Milwaukee
Aerie No. 137, 472 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-76 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Cornelius v. Benevolent
Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974); United States v.
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such as the amount of any membership fee °3 and members' control
over the selection of new members. 10 4
The membership's control over the operation of the club is also an
important factor in determining private club status. 05 For example,
a fishing and hunting club lost its status as a private club because
its members could claim little control over the club operations when
roads running over the club's property were open to the public and
were maintained by the county. '06 In addition, private club status can
be lost if the club membership allows the public regular use of club
facilities.0 7 Clubs have lost private club status by sharing swimming
and tennis facilities with the public and advertising the open use of
club facilities by the public.1'0
B. The Private Clubs' Exemption from Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964109
If a club meets the criteria of a truly private club, privacy
rights will prevail over civil rights laws." 0 Congress has attempted
to balance First Amendment rights of bona fide private clubs and
anti-discrimination laws in public accommodations by providing an
exemption for private clubs."' In essence, a private club's size,
social purpose, and selectivity is contrary to the definition of a
public accommodation." 2
1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act and Public Accommodations
To avoid government scrutiny of its selective membership
policies and practices, a club will likely argue that it is not a public
Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375 (E.D. La. 1969).
103. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 797.
104. Id.; Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375.
105. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375-76.
106. See Redlake Fishing and Hunting Club, 666 F. Supp. at 960.
107. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A. of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968)
(noting that the Y.M.C.A. facilities were "in practice fully available to any white
applicant" and thus was constructively open to most members of the public).
108. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 803 (noting that regular use of swim club
by nonmembers was inconsistent with claim that club was private); see also New York
v. Ocean Club, 602 F. Supp. 489, 496 (E.D. N.Y. 1984) (stating that the tennis club was
not private because it advertised its facilities to the public and the public regularly used
its tennis courts); Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1980)
(finding that a country club that circulated a newsletter to the public and solicited new
members was not a private club).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 610, 620 (1983).
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accommodation. To eradicate discrimination by private individuals
in places of public accommodation, Congress enacted Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.113 The public accommodations law of Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits "discrimination or seg-
regation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin" in
places of "public accommodation." 114 Although many types of dis-
crimination in public accommodations are prohibited by Title II,
gender discrimination is not explicitly prohibited." 5 Women are nota-
bly absent from the categories of individuals covered by Title II.116
Section 2000a(a) specifically provides that "[a]ll persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.., without discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.""' 7 Under the
Act, a place of "public accommodation" includes any place or organi-
zation which falls under any one of the following categories:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena,
stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment... which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection,
or... within the premises of which is physically located any such
covered establishment, and.., which holds itself out as serving
patrons of such covered establishment. '18
These categories of "public accommodation" are broad. A place of
accommodation is any "place of exhibition or entertainment" whose
"operations affect commerce ... ,."" "Entertainment" is also a broad
term and includes such activities as participating in and viewing
sports activities. 2 °
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (2006); see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306 (1968).
120. See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305-06; see also Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club,
Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399,402 (E.D. Va. 1983); Beth Parker, Membership Has Its Privileges:
Defiant Private Clubs Are Testing the Boundaries of Associational Rights, CAL. LAWYER,
June 1988, at 46.
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Once a court determines that an organization, association, or
physical facility is a place of "public accommodation" covered by the
Act, the court will usually find that it also affects commerce.' 2 ' The
statute provides that a place of entertainment affects "commerce if
it customarily presents... athletic teams, . . . or other sources of enter-
tainment which move in commerce...."122 Many activities conducted
by ostensibly private clubs may also affect commerce. For example,
clubs have "affected interstate commerce" by using a diving board
that was manufactured out-of-state,'23 by allowing out-of-state guests
in a club,'24 by hosting an annual golf tournament attended by "out-of-
state professionals and club members,"125 and by allowing an out-of-
state golf team to play on a golf course once a year.'26
Despite Title II's many categories of public accommodations and
its seemingly broad application, Title II is not effective for eradicating
discrimination at private clubs. Although Title II proscribes racial,
religious, and ethnic discrimination in places of accommodation,
women are not protected by the Act.'27 Moreover, because Title II
includes no definition of "private club," the determination of whether
a particular club is a bona fide private club is made by the courts on
a case by case basis."2 One commentator has noted that "[t]he private
club exemption and corresponding uncertainty in the interpretation
of this standard make Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an
unlikely weapon for those combating discrimination within private
country clubs.' ' 29
2. The Private Club Exemption
Once a court makes the determination that a particular club is
indeed private, the club is specifically exempt from the coverage of
the Civil Rights Act. 3 ° Section 2000a(e) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
provides that
121. See, e.g., Daniel, 395 U.S. at 308 (holding that the Lake Nixon Club affected
commerce as it leased boats from another state, owned a juke box that was constructed
outside of the state, and "play[ed] records manufactured outside the [s]tate"). Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c).
123. United States v Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
124. Id.
125. See Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. at 402.
126. Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966).
127. See supra notes 115-17.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (2006).
129. Scott R. Rosner, Reflections on Augusta: Judicial, Legislative and Economic
Approaches to Private Race and Gender Consciousness, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 135,
159 (2003).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a(e) (2006).
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this subchapter... shall not apply to a private club or other es-
tablishments not in fact open to the public, except to the extent
that the facilities of such establishment are made available to
the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope
of subsection (b) of this section."'
If a club is deemed a bona fide private club with constitutionally
protected associational rights, the law will not only shield it from the
civil rights laws, it will be entitled to government privileges under tax
exemption laws.
III. TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR PRIVATE CLUBS: GOVERNMENT
SUBSIDIES TO CLUBS THAT DISCRIMINATE
Private clubs are not only exempt from civil rights laws, but in
many cases the government subsidizes discrimination at clubs by
exempting them from paying taxes.'32 Private clubs receive public
tax breaks through their federal nonprofit status, which exempts them
from paying federal income tax.'33 In addition, private clubs receive
state tax benefits as they are often exempt from the state franchise
tax paid on income."'
Private clubs are exempt from income tax liability because they
are social clubs and non-profit organizations.135 Section 501 states
that "[a]n organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section
401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such
exemption is denied under section 502 or 503. '' 136 Tax exempt social
clubs are "[c]lubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other non-
profitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for
such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder."'3 7
Although Congress intended to give preferential tax treatments
to social clubs and non-profit organizations, Congress never intended
to reward discrimination by granting tax benefits to clubs that dis-
criminate against otherwise protected classes in membership or club
privileges.' Recognizing that tax exemptions may directly subsidize
131. Id.
132. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-58 (D.D.C. 1972) (noting that
an income tax exemption to a private club with discriminatory admissions policy is con-
stitutional. An exemption is not equivalent to government involvement in or approval
of racial discrimination).
133. 26 U.S.CA § 501(c)(7) (2006) (exempting nonprofit clubs from paying income taxes);
26 U.S.CA § 501(c)(8) (2006) (exempting fraternal orders from paying income taxes).
134. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010 (West 2006).
135. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) (2006).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
137. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) (2006).
138. See S. REP. NO. 94-1318, at 8 (1976).
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private club discrimination, Congress enacted a law denying tax ex-
empt status to clubs that blatantly discriminate "on the basis of race,
color, or religion" in written "charter [s], bylaws, or other governing
instrument[s]."139 The written policy exclusion provides: "[a]n organi-
zation ... is to lose its exempt status... for any taxable year if, at any
time during that year, the organization's charter, bylaws, or other gov-
erning instrument ... contains a provision which provides for discrim-
ination against any person on the basis of race, color, or religion."'4 °
Congress intended to avoid subsidizing discrimination through the
grant of government benefits.' The legislative history of the Internal
Revenue Code contains this statement: "[I]t is inappropriate for a
social club or similar organization described in section 501 (c)(7) to be
exempt from income taxation if its written policy is to discriminate on
account of race, color, or religion."'42 Despite Congress's good inten-
tions, however, the written policy exclusion has little teeth, as few
clubs today are bold enough to include written statements in bylaws
and other important instruments that they intentionally discriminate
on the basis of race, color, or religion.'43 Moreover, as the exclusion
does not include gender, it does nothing for women who are denied
membership and benefits at many private clubs across the country.'44
Like Title II, gender is not even mentioned in Congress's written
policy exclusion.'45
Scholars have repeatedly criticized Congress's nondiscrimination
provision as overly restrictive and ineffective in remedying discrimi-
nation at private clubs. 4 ' Most discrimination today is not blatantly
written in a policy.'47 In arguing that racial and gender bias is preva-
lent in the tax exemption law, particularly as applied to private social
clubs, David A. Brennen, professor of tax law at Mercer University
asks, "[d]oes this mean that official and authorized discrimination
by words or actions of key members of a tax-exempt social club cannot
cause the organization to lose its federal tax exemption?"'43 Professor
Brennen suggests that a tax exemption statute written by black
Congressmen and Congresswomen would likely not be as restrictive
as the one enacted by Congress in 1976.' This hypothetical statute
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(I) (2006).
140. S. REP. No. 94-1318 at 8 (1976).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Rosner, supra note 129, at 175.
144. See supra notes 140 and 142 and accompanying text.
145. See S. REP. No. 94-1318 (1976).
146. See, e.g., Rosner, supra note 129, at 174-76.
147. Id. at 175.
148. David A. Brennen, Race and Equality Across the Law School Curriculum: The
Law of Tax Exemption, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 346 (2004).
149. Id. at 346-47.
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"would likely address discrimination in various forms, whether re-
flected expressly in written documents or not."'50 Professor Brennen
also suggests that Congress's failure to prohibit gender discrimination
as a prerequisite to obtaining federal tax exempt status constitutes
unacceptable gender bias in tax exemption law."' In sum, Congress's
written policy exclusion is underinclusive and ineffective in the battle
to eradicate discrimination at private clubs.
If Congress does nothing to eradicate discrimination at private
clubs, it should at the very least refrain from subsidizing discrimina-
tion on the taxpayer's dime by granting tax benefits or other govern-
ment privileges to discriminatory clubs. Private clubs' favorable treat-
ment under civil rights laws and tax exempt laws, combined with
Congress's ineffective written policy exclusion, reaps private clubs
substantial financial benefits. One author has noted that "[elvery year
in Texas, private recreational clubs save an estimated $1.1 million by
not paying state franchise taxes; several clubs in Dallas save approxi-
mately $1.7 million each in federal income taxes every year because of
the exemption."'52 In addition, individual members in private clubs can
take income tax deductions.'53 Questioning tax exemptions for such
private clubs, one Texas state representative, who unsuccessfully
sought to end the Texas tax exemption for private clubs, stated that
"[n]ot unlike vampires, their exemptions allow [private clubs] to suck
the financial resources which normally would go, for instance, toward
public education."'54 When discrimination takes place in private clubs,
it is being funded on the taxpayer's dime.' 55
IV. NOT ON THE TAXPAYER'S DIME: ABOLISHING GOVERNMENT
SUBSIDIES FOR DISCRIMINATION BY DENYING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO
DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE CLUBS
"[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy," 5 ' and as a
corollary, "the power to exempt involves the power to flourish."'57
150. Id. at 347.
151. Id.
152. Rosner, supra note 129, at n.253.
153. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 120, at 51; Rosner, supra note 129, at 139.
154. Mark Wrolstad & Tracy Everbach, Most-Elite Country Clubs Haven't Admitted
Blacks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 1A (quoting state representative Ron
Wilson, Houston).
155. See id.
156. Lynn Lu, Flunking the Methodology Test: A Flawed Tax-Exemption Standard for
Educational Organizations That "Advocate[] a Particular Position or Viewpoint," 29
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 377, 377 (2004) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819)).
157. Id. at 377.
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These statements are particularly true when considering government-
granted tax exemptions to private clubs. Congress exempts private
clubs from civil rights laws and from paying taxes, which allows dis-
crimination to flourish at some clubs. 158 Denying those exemptions,
however, could "be perceived as an indication that an organization's
activities fail to meet governmental standards or pursue government-
approved policies, although they fall short of being sanctionable."'' "
Even though discrimination is legal at private clubs, many club mem-
bers would not engage in such activities if doing so had financial costs.
Increased government scrutiny of private club practices could raise
awareness of discriminatory practices, perhaps resulting in fewer
citizens desiring membership.
Contrary to the bona fide private clubs exemption under the
public accommodations provisions of civil rights laws and the codifi-
cation of freedom of association, a tax exemption is a matter of govern-
ment privilege or benefit. "o Thus tax-exempt status for discrimina-
tory private clubs is a "symbol of government tolerance, if not out-
right approval of [discriminatory] activities."'6 ' Taxpayers become
the "indirect and vicarious 'donors"' of private clubs' discrimination. 62
Taxpayers have an interest in the fair administration of tax laws
and in seeing that the grant of government benefits and privileges does
not promote discrimination. A club's freedom of intimate association,
although constitutionally protected, does not outweigh the State's com-
pelling interest in eliminating tax subsidies for illegal discrimination.
A tax benefit or preferential treatment is not a constitutionally pro-
tected right. A state may remove tax benefits to private clubs that dis-
criminate on the basis of race, gender, or religion, even if the private
clubs qualify as highly selective in accepting members.'63 A number
of state legislatures have done just that, determining that discrimi-
nation should not occur at private clubs on the taxpayer's dime. They
have enacted legislation requiring private clubs to surrender their
tax-exempt status if they discriminate against certain individuals.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 379.
160. Rosner, supra note 129, at 174.
161. Lu, supra note 156, at 379; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
190 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that racial
discrimination is particularly "grave when government has or shares responsibility for
it. Government is the social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of
liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment and the setting of worthy norms and goals for
social conduct"). Id.
162. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1982).
163. State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 378-81 (Md. 1989) (holding that
freedom of intimate association did not outweigh Maryland's removal of tax benefits to
a sizable all-male organization devoted to playing golf, even though the organization
was highly selective in accepting members).
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Many of these state provisions are broader than the federal pro-
visions, as they prohibit discrimination against more categories of
individuals. Many of them also define public accommodation broadly
enough to include many private country clubs and golf clubs.
A. Overview of State Laws Abolishing Government Subsidies for
Discrimination
State legislatures primarily decline to extend government privi-
leges and benefits to discriminatory private clubs in three areas. In
some states, discriminatory private clubs are excluded by legislation
from taking income tax deductions.1 Some states refuse to give liquor
licenses to discriminatory private clubs.'65 Private clubs, often holding
valuable property and expansive open space, cannot take property tax
deductions." In many situations, the statutory exclusions and denial
of benefits applicable to private clubs are much broader and perhaps
easier to administer than federal efforts.
1. Income Tax Benefits
California denies both personal income tax deductions and cor-
porate tax deductions to private clubs "restrict [ing] membership or the
use of its services or facilities on the basis of age, sex, race, religion,
color, ancestry, or national origin."'67 In addition, whereas the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 fails to provide a definition of "private club" and
only addresses public accommodations, California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act provides that "[a]ll persons.., are free and equal, ... no matter
what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, [or] national origin" and
provides that they "are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establish-
ments of every kind whatsoever."'
Similarly, Colorado denies personal income tax deductions in-
curred by taxpayers claiming expenditures at any club which has a
164. See, e.g., CAL REV. & TAX CODE §17269 (West 1997); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§24343.2 (West 1987); COLO REV. STAT. §39-22-104(3)(e)(I) (1997).
165. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-571D(h) (2004); 235 ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 5/6-17
(LexisNexis 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §1301-A (1974).
166. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., TAX-PRoP. §8-214 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. §273.112.3
(2000).
167. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17269 (West 2004); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 24343.2
(West 2004).
168. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 51 (West 2001). Notably, the Unruh Act includes women. The
Act was successfully invoked by a woman in California who had been denied country
club membership at Peninsula Golf and Country Club. See Warfield v. Peninsula Golf &
Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 782, 798 (Cal. 1995).
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policy restricting membership on the basis of race, sex, religion, color,
ancestry, or national origin.169 In Colorado, the burden is placed upon
discriminatory clubs to print a statement of non-deductibility on each
receipt furnished to members.' The requirement may provide a dis-
incentive to clubs inclined to discriminate and provide an enforceable
mechanism of denying tax benefits to members of discriminatory
clubs. Placing the burden upon the clubs in the first instance may
allow them to self-regulate and avoid costly litigation.
Like California and Colorado, the Commonwealth of Kentucky
has attempted to abolish state tax subsidies that benefit discrimina-
tory private clubs. The Kentucky Revenue Code prohibits deductions
from taxpayers' net incomes of any amount
paid to any club, organization, or establishment which has been
determined by the courts or an agency.., charged with enforcing
the civil rights laws.., not to afford full and equal membership
and full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations to any person because of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex .... 171
Although the Kentucky statute does not distinguish between
public accommodations and private clubs, it does require a finding
of discrimination by the courts or civil rights agency as a prerequi-
site to enforcement.
72
2. Liquor Licenses
Many states withhold government-regulated privileges such as
liquor licenses from clubs that discriminate against individuals who
otherwise would be protected by civil rights laws. 73 The grant of
a liquor license involves the unique power of the state under the
169. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104(3)(e)(I) (1997).
170. Id.
171. KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 141.010(ll)(d) (LexisNexis 2006).
172. Id.
173. See Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 516 N.E.2d
1153, 1159 (Mass. 1987) (upholding a liquor license revocation where a night club delib-
erately discriminated against African Americans seeking entrance in violation of a state
anti-discrimination statute); B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 of Brunswick v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d
607, 608, 615, 619-20 (Me. 1972) (holding that the Maine Liquor Commission was within
its lawful authority when denying renewal liquor licenses to fifteen Elks Lodges under
a state statute prohibiting licensees from withholding membership on the basis of race);
see also Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 515, 517-18 (Utah
1993) (finding that the Elks qualified as an "enterprise regulated by the state" and were
subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act).
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Twenty-First Amendment to regulate liquor use.'74 Therefore, the
refusal to issue or renew a liquor license to a club that discriminates
in its membership practices is permissible under the Constitution.'75
For example, a Maine statute prohibits discrimination by holders
of state licenses.'76 By agreeing to become licensees of the Department
of Alcohol and Beverage Control, private clubs and their members may
become subject to state civil rights laws.' Connecticut allows courts
to revoke liquor licenses of golf country clubs that discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation, among other charac-
teristics.' This provision could be applied to clubs that make women
wait behind men to tee off. Similarly, the New Jersey Senate passed
a bill requiring all private clubs to equalize any club benefits between
men and women.'79
Kentucky recently adopted a statute that requires golf courses
to voluntarily comply with the state's civil rights laws, even though
they may be otherwise exempt from civil rights laws, as a prerequi-
site to selling alcoholic beverages. 80 The statute provides that
the Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control shall not issue a license
to an applicant authorized to apply for a license to sell alcoholic
beverages by the drink ... unless the applicant and the golf
course... agree to voluntarily comply [with the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act] whether or not the applicant and the golf course is
a private club."'
The Office has the power to "revoke or suspend any license... if the
office or the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights makes a find-
ing that the applicant.., has violated a requirement specified" in the
state civil rights laws.'82
3. Property Taxes
Many private clubs, including country clubs and golf clubs, own
substantial acres of valuable land that states exempt from property
174. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972); B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043, 297
A.2d at 612 n.3.
175. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043, 297 A.2d at 607.
176. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1301-A (2005); see also 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/6-17 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. § 46-10-13.1 (West 1973).
177. See Elks Lodges Nos. 719 & 2021 v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d
1189, 1200 (Utah 1995); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-1 (LexisNexis 2006).
178. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571D(h) (2004).
179. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f)(2) (West 2002).
180. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 242.1232 (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring golf courses to agree
to comply with the provisions of KRS Chapter 344).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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tax laws in exchange for an agreement to keep the property as open
space. Some states deny this property tax exemption to private clubs
that discriminate against individuals who are otherwise protected
under the civil rights laws.
Under Minnesota's Open Space Property Tax Law, the state
denies tax exemptions and lower property tax rates to private country
clubs with fifty or more members and more than five acres if they dis-
criminate on the basis of gender or marital status.183 Furthermore,
"[a] golf club that has food or beverage facilities or services must allow
equal access to those facilities and services for both men and women
members in all membership categories at all times."'" This provision
assumes open tee times for all adult members with playing privileges
and guarantees spouses equal access privileges.'85 Unlike federal tax
provisions, the Minnesota statute places at least some burden on the
club to show that it qualifies for preferential tax treatment by re-
quiring the club to demonstrate that it does not discriminate within
its bylaws, rules, or regulations." The club may be required to prove,
"by affidavit or other written verification that the bylaws or rules and
regulations of the club meet the eligibility requirements" and the
county attorney may require the club to "furnish information that the
county attorney considers necessary in order to determine eligibility.'
187
Maryland also denies property tax exemptions to private clubs
that discriminate on the basis of "race, color, creed, sex, or national
origin" in membership practices or services or privileges to guests.18
Maryland's statute prohibits country clubs or golf courses from main-
taining discriminatory membership or guest privilege policies once
they agree to maintain their land for open spaces in exchange for
favorable tax treatment.'89 The Maryland statute provides:
(a)... If a country club that meets the qualifications of § 8-212
of this subtitle allows or practices discrimination based on race,
color, creed, sex, or national origin in granting membership or
183. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.112.3 (West 1999). But cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02 (West
2004) (noting that the provisions prohibiting gender discrimination "do not apply to re-
stricting membership on an athletic team or in a program or event to participants of one
sex if the restriction is necessary to preserve the unique character of the team, program,
or event and it would not substantially reduce comparable athletic opportunities for the
other sex"). Id.
184. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.112.3 (West 1999).
185. Id. Nevertheless, a limited number of separate, but equal, tee times are permitted.
Id. at § 273.112.3(3)(d) (noting that tee times may be limited on the basis of sex up to one
weekend per month and two weekdays per week).
186. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.112.6 (West 1999).
187. Id.
188. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 8-214 (LexisNexis 2001).
189. Id.
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guest privileges, the country club may not make or continue an
agreement under this subtitle.
(b) ... A country club many not discriminate or retaliate against
any person who has opposed any discrimination practice prohibited
by subsection (a) of this section or who has filed a complaint, testi-
fied, or assisted a party in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing conducted under § 8-215 of this subtitle.19
Enforcement powers in Maryland are vested in the state's Attorney
General.191
B. Difficulties Proving Discrimination at Private Clubs and
Administering State Laws Designed to Abolish Government
Subsidies for Discrimination
Private club membership practices or the denial of club benefits
motivated by a person's race, gender or religion is discriminatory, but
legal, because of the constitutional right of intimate association.192
Even though discrimination is legal, proving disparate treatment of
individuals at private clubs based upon race, gender, or religion is
essential to avoid subsidization of discrimination at the taxpayer's
expense. Some state statutes require a finding of discrimination at
a private club before the state will deny any government benefits or
privileges. 9 ' Proving discrimination without infringing upon individual
member's privacy rights may be difficult. In addition to the constitu-
tional issues of delving into private clubs, it is often difficult to produce
direct evidence of discrimination, as "clever men may easily conceal
their motivations." '194 Even if discrimination can be proven in the first
instance, it is a difficult task to administer laws designed to eliminate
tax exemptions or other privileges to discriminatory clubs.
1. Who is Responsible for Determining Whether a Private
Club Discriminates?
Once a state enacts legislation designed to abolish subsidies for
discrimination through favorable tax treatment, a question remains:
who is responsible for determining whether a club discriminates in
190. Id. The statute was upheld against a constitutional challenge in State v. Burning
Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 381, 387 (Md. 1989).
191. See 89 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 38 (1989).
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("the right of the people peaceably to assemble"); 42
U.S.C. § 2000(a)(e) (exempting private clubs from public accommodation laws).
193. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52.571(h) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
1301-A (2005).
194. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
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the first instance? Will the responsibility lie with the courts, a federal
agency, or a state agency?
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Kentucky resolved the question of whether any agency within
the Commonwealth had the authority to determine whether private
golf and country clubs, which are exempt from the state's civil rights
laws, discriminate.19 The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that
the state agency charged with enforcing the Kentucky civil rights laws
had the "authority to investigate private clubs to determine if they
engage [d] in discriminatory conduct in such a manner that members
would be prohibited from deducting payments."' The opinion of the
court was confined to the issue of enforcement and investigative
powers of the state agency charged with administering and adjudi-
cating civil rights cases, rather than whether the clubs actually dis-
criminated against certain individuals.'97 The Kentucky Supreme
Court found that the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR)
had an implied statutory right to investigate alleged discriminatory
practices of private clubs to prevent the clubs and their members from
finding shelter in the tax code.' 8
195. See Commonwealth v. Pendennis Club, 153 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Ky. 2004).
196. Id. at 785.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 788-89. Pendennis Club originated with a complaint of alleged discrimi-
natory membership practices against several Kentucky country clubs. Id. at 786. An
original complaint against the country clubs about membership practices was dismissed
by the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR), which determined that the
clubs had a statutory right to discriminate without fear of legal liability, pursuant to the
state's private club exemption to its public accommodations provisions, KRS § 344.130(1).
Id. Shortly thereafter, State Representative Anne Northup requested an opinion from the
Attorney General to clarify the effect of KRS § 14 1.010(11) (d); specifically, Representative
Northup questioned whether the statute granted KCHR the authority to investigate tax
deductions of discriminatory clubs and its members. Id. The Attorney General's opinion
determined that although private clubs were not liable for discriminatory membership
practices, KCHR was not prohibited from investigating these clubs to determine if they
received state tax benefits. Id.
The Federal Court determined that the statute did not give KCHR the authority to
investigate the clubs. Id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the ruling, finding that
the district court "should have abstained from ruling on the case while administrative
proceedings were underway." Id. KCHR then sought "a declaratory judgment as to its
power to investigate the clubs" from the Jefferson Circuit Court. Id. The circuit court ruled
in favor of "the clubs, holding that KRS § 344.130 specifically exempted the clubs from
the KCHR's [oversight]." Id. The court of appeals affirmed, and the supreme court granted
discretionary review of the decision. Id.
The Kentucky Legislature enacted the KCHR "to safeguard the rights of citizens to
be free from discrimination on the basis of race and other enumerated characteristics."
Id. at 786-87. The supreme court noted that the legislature required courts to interpret the
statute in such a way that would fulfill the purposes and objectives of the Civil Rights
Act. Id. at 787. As a result, any exceptions to the Act would be interpreted narrowly. Id.
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The court noted that although private clubs may be exempt from
public accommodation laws, they are not entirely exempt from civil
rights laws.199 For example, while discriminatory clubs may not be
liable for damages for withholding membership benefits, they could
be civilly liable for discriminatory employment practices. 20 Under
these circumstances, the state agency charged with investigating and
adjudicating discrimination claims "would have authority to exercise
its powers."2 1 Relying upon Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles,20 2
the Supreme Court reasoned that alternate forms of recovery against
discriminatory clubs exist, demonstrating that clubs do not have a
"carte blanche" ability to discriminate.2 3
The Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that the power to inves-
tigate is inherent in the power to make determinations.2 4 Although
this principle is implicit in the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
United States Constitution,2 5 the court found the same authority in
the Kentucky General Assembly's power to interpret statutes in the
furtherance of the statute's purpose.206 The court reasoned that allow-
ing KCHR to take investigatory actions enabling it to make deter-
minations mandated by the legislature is "common sense. 20 7
Although state laws provide no explicit authority for investigatory
powers, these powers are implied from the necessity of collecting in-
formation before a determination can be made as to discriminatory
practices by clubs. 2 8 The court clarified KCHR's ability to ensure that
199. Id. at 787.
200. Pendennis Club, 153 S.W. 3d at 787.
201. Id.
202. 915 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 1990).
203. Pendennis Club, 153 S.W. 3d at 787. The clubs argued that
KRS § 141.010(l1)(d) does not grant KCHR authority to investigate [because,
1) the statutory] language parallels the language in the public accommo-
dation provision found in KRS § 344.120[, and 2)] the language... cannot
grant, the KCHR independent authority to make determinations because [the
statute was] drafted in the past tense.
Id. at 788. The court distinguished the two statutes, noting that KRS § 141.010 "applies
to 'any club' without limitation," not just non-private clubs, as does KRS § 344.120. Id.
This application "includes clubs that fail to 'afford full and equal membership' [benefits]
because of race," not just those clubs that deal with public accommodations. Id. The court
reasoned that this language was not found in the other statutes, therefore the other
statutes did not give immunity. Id. As to the second argument, the court concluded that
"the language [was] written in the past tense because the Revenue Cabinet [could not]
deny a tax deduction until the KCHR [had] made a determination that the club discrimi-
nates." Id.
204. Id. (relying upon McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
206. Pendennis Club, 153 S.W.3d at 788.
207. Id. at 789.
208. Id.
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discriminatory clubs find no sanctuary in the tax code by acknowl-
edging the power to investigate clubs.2"9
Similar reasoning applies to determine that the federal agency
created to enforce federal civil rights laws and civil rights agencies
in other states can determine whether a club qualifies for favorable
tax treatment. Although federal provisions and state statutes may
exempt private clubs from public accommodations provisions, private
clubs' associational rights should not shield them from scrutiny if they
or their members choose to take advantage of government benefits
and privileges.
2. How is Discrimination by a Private Club Proven without
Interfering with Privacy Rights?
Once the legislature or the courts determine who or what govern-
ment agency has the authority to investigate private clubs for purposes
of denying government benefits or privileges to discriminatory private
clubs, the next question becomes, how the government can prove dis-
crimination within the bounds of the Constitution. Despite the large
amount of the litigation involving private clubs that has focused upon
the constitutional protections of individual club members, courts have
provided little guidance as to how to prove discrimination for the
limited purpose of avoiding subsidization of private club discrimination
through tax laws. The burden of proof standards used in employment
discrimination cases and fair housing law may be useful and trans-
ferable to cases involving private club discrimination for the purpose
of enforcing and administering tax laws. In combating the subsidiza-
tion of discrimination at private clubs through the tax laws, the gov-
ernment has in its arsenal theories based on direct evidence of dis-
crimination, disparate treatment of individuals, and disparate impact.
a. Proving Discrimination at Private Clubs by Written
Policies, Direct Statements, or Admissions
A private club may legally discriminate against any individual and
be as blatant about it as it chooses.21° Blatant discrimination goes far
in helping the government determine whether a private club is being
subsidized through tax laws at other taxpayers' expense. If a club
has a written policy of discrimination, the privacy rights of individ-
ual members are not implicated and the problem of proof is straight-
forward. The written policy provides direct proof of discrimination
209. Id.
210. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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without scrutinizing membership lists or other documents, which may
reveal the identities of individual members. As a result, privacy rights
are not implicated.
To avoid subsidizing discrimination through tax deductions, clubs
could file their charters, bylaws, or other governing instruments with
the appropriate agencies charged with administering civil rights laws,
tax laws, or liquor licenses. Private clubs would thereby be encouraged
to consider the wording of their charters, bylaws, or other governing
instruments. Requiring the filing of non-discriminatory written docu-
ments as a prerequisite to the receipt of government privileges would
serve as a disincentive to clubs that discriminate without intruding
upon the privacy rights of individual club members.
Most cases of discrimination, however, are not so blatant and
cannot be proven by a written document. Moreover, the prospect of
government scrutiny of tax forms serves as a disincentive to clubs
putting a discriminatory policy in writing. Even if a club spells out
its discriminatory policy in writing, the filing of a policy may not go far
in preventing individual members from taking tax deductions for club
activities. As a first step in going beyond the writing limitation, and
as a prerequisite to receiving favorable tax treatment, liquor licenses,
or other government privileges, Congress could expand the law to re-
quire an affirmative statement by clubs that they do not discriminate,
much like the statement required in the employment context.21' Clubs
that choose to discriminate or choose not to comply could be required
to include statements on all sales receipts stating that members can
not take tax deductions for services or items provided by the club.212
Placing the burden upon the club in the first instance to comply
with the amended statute or place the disclaimer on receipts, will dis-
courage individual club members from using club receipts as the basis
for tax benefits. The tax exemption laws should be no more difficult
to enforce than deductions taken for charitable contributions.2"3 Thus,
if audited, a taxpayer claiming charitable deductions may be required
to produce valid receipts for contributions with no disclaimer that they
can not be used for tax purposes.
211. While many employers voluntarily include on employment applications an equal
employment opportunity policy statement against discriminatory hiring, federal con-
tractors are required to provide an equal employment opportunity statement on contracts
and applications. 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3 (2006) ("Written personnel policies . . . must
expressly indicate that there shall be no discrimination against employees on account
of sex. If the employer deals with a bargaining representative for his employees and there
is a written agreement on conditions of employment, such agreement shall not be in-
consistent with these guidelines.").
212. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17269(b) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-
104(3)(e)(I) (2004).
213. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006) (establishing an income tax deduction for charitable
contributions).
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b. Proving Discrimination at Private Clubs Through
Disparate Treatment
If a club treats some people less favorably than others because
of their race, gender, or religion, a causal connection may be proven
under a disparate treatment theory.214 The disparate treatment theory
requires proof of discriminatory intent.215 Circumstantial evidence can
be used to prove a club's motivation and intent.216
The government may utilize the burdens of proof for Title VII,
which prohibit discrimination in employment,217 to prove discrimi-
nation in private club cases involving the question of the legality
of tax deductions. For example, the government has relied upon a
disparate treatment theory to prove discrimination in cases under
the Fair Housing Act (FHA).215 The Second Circuit, in Soules v. U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, employed the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting procedure in a case brought
under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).21 '9 The court stated that "to make
out a prima facie discriminatory housing refusal case, a plaintiff must
show that he is a member of a statutorily protected class who applied
for and was qualified to rent or purchase housing and was rejected
though the housing remained available.2 120 The defendant was then
given the opportunity "to explain whether his actions were motivated
by impermissible considerations.... If, however the defendant de-
clines the opportunity to present evidence toward this end, the plain-
tiff is entitled to relief."2
2
'
A member of a class traditionally protected by civil rights laws,
who has been denied membership or benefits by a private club, could
likely provide the impetus for a disparate treatment claim asserted
against a private club for tax law purposes. In housing discrimi-
nation cases, the government often utilizes "testers" to prove dispa-
rate treatment.222 "Testers" are members of a protected class who
apply for housing in an attempt to determine whether landlords are
214. Int'l Bhd. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 (1977); Vill. ofArlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
215. U.S. Postal Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
216. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
217. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(2) (2006).
218. See, e.g., Soules v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 821-22 (2d
Cir. 1992).
219. Id. at 822.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 368 (1982); Gladstone
Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979); see also Tandy v. City of Witchita,
380 F.3d 1277, 1281(10th Cir. 2004); O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1004
(7th Cir. 2002).
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employing discriminatory practices.22 The government could simi-
larly utilize testers to determine whether private clubs discriminate in
membership practices for the limited purpose of determining whether
the club or membership qualifies for any tax deductions. Using the
burden shifting procedure for a disparate treatment claim announced
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,224 the government would need
to prove that
1. the person was a member of a class otherwise protected by
the civil rights laws;
2. the person applied for membership or benefits in the private
club and was qualified for the membership or benefits. For
example, membership in a private club might require a cer-
tain income level or residence in a certain geographic area.
If it can not be proven that she meets the required criteria,
the disparate treatment theory fails;
3. the person was denied membership or benefits by the private
club; and
4. the opportunity for membership or benefits remained avail-
able thereafter.225
If the government meets the above prima facie case of discrimination,
the private club may rebut the case by bringing forth evidence of
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse decision.226 If
the private club is successful, the burden would shift back to the
government to prove that the private club's legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the decision is merely a pretext for discrimination.227
c. Proving Discrimination at Private Clubs Through
Disparate Impact
Disparate impact theory allows conduct that, although equally
applied to all, has an adverse effect on protected class members as
compared to majority class members.228 It also allows recovery when
there is proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.229 In private
223. Id.
224. 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 804.
228. Id. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (noting that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation").
229. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. See Int'l Bhd. Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (requiring the government to demonstrate that "racial
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club cases based upon disparate impact theory, the standard of proof
might be similar to the test set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.
2 30
To bring a disparate impact claim against a private club, first the
government needs to present a prima facie case of disparate impact.
To formulate a prima facie case, the government needs to identify
a membership practice that has caused a statistical under-represen-
tation of members of an otherwise protected class.2 31 Second, the gov-
ernment would need to show that the membership practice is not
reasonably connected to an applicant's qualifications for club member-
ship and "has caused the exclusion of... applicants because of their
membership in a protected group."232
Disparate impact theory has been used outside of the employ-
ment context and could be useful in proving that tax exemptions or de-
ductions should not be permitted by private clubs or their members.233
For example, the theory has been used in the area of housing.2 34 In
United States v. City of Black Jack, "the complaint alleged that the
City had denied persons housing on the basis of race.., by adopting
a zoning ordinance which prohibited construction of any new multiple-
family dwellings."23 The complainants asserted that, although fair in
form, these practices were discriminatory in operation.2 36 The United
States brought a claim under the Fair Housing Act of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 against the city and used statistics to prove its claim that
the ordinance had a disparate impact upon African Americans.23 v The
statistics showed that although the City of Black Jack's population
was ninety-nine percent white, forty percent of African-American
families in the city lived in overcrowded units.238 The court held that
these statistics were sufficient to raise a presumption of discrimina-
tion and satisfied a prima facie case.23 Once the plaintiff estab-
lished a prima facie case by demonstrating a racially discriminatory
discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure" if the government
claimed that there was a "systemwide pattern or practice of resistence to the full enjoy-
ment of Title VII rights").
230. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that standardized tests and certain graduation
requirements violated Title VII because they had a discriminatory effect and were not
found to measure job performance accurately).
231. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
232. Id.
233. See infra notes 236-45 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974).
236. Id. at 1184.
237. Id. at 1183.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1186.
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effect, the burden shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that its
conduct was the result of a nondiscriminatory reason for the prac-
tice.24° Proof of discriminatory intent can be inferred from the differ-
ence in treatment.24'
Statistical evidence can be used to make out a prima facie case
of discrimination in a disparate impact case, such as a case against
a private club.242 Statistics showing a racial or ethnic imbalance in
membership can signal purposeful discrimination.243 A claimant may
use a statistical analysis of the membership to show a disparity in
membership among minorities and women. This evidence could be
used to prove discrimination at a private club for purposes of prevent-
ing illegal tax deductions.
The use of statistics to prove discrimination at private clubs could
be very advantageous. Rather than focusing upon individual members
of a private club, the demographics of the club would be scrutinized.
Discovery requests might be designed to elicit numbers showing the
proportion of minority and women members or prospective members
of the club, without the necessity of discovery of individual names of
club members.
Nonetheless, a problem that could arise with the use of statistics
to show discrimination at a private club may be the unavailability of
a significant sample size. A disparate impact can be established by
statistical proof alone, but the statistical pool must be logically related
to the adverse selection decision and the statistical application must
be meaningful.244 The use of statistics may prove unreliable when
determining whether a selective private club, with a small number
of members, discriminates on the basis of race, gender, or religion.24
3. Once Discrimination is Proven, How Can Tax Deductions
by Individual Club Members be Prohibited Without Violating
Privacy Rights?
As a threshold matter, the government can determine whether
a private club discriminates against individuals on the basis of race,
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1185.
242. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,307-08 (1977); Int'l Bhd.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
243. See id.; United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974).
244. See Moore v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 593 F.2d 607,608 (5th Cir. 1979).
245. A number of courts have emphasized the importance of ensuring that statistics
be derived from an adequate sample. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340
(explaining that the applicability of statistics depends upon the "surrounding facts and
circumstances"); Morita v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 541 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir.
1976) (noting that a sample of eight persons is too small to be statistically significant).
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gender, and religion without implicating privacy rights of individual
club members. The initial determination of discrimination may be
based upon the policies or actions of the club as an entity, or based
upon statistics showing the demographics of club membership or the
club's selective activities. However, the determination of what triggers
an audit of individual taxpayers' returns, as a result of investigating
a club, may have significant constitutional ramifications. An individual
taxpayer audit, triggered by mere membership in a private club, is a
chilling thought.
Moreover, determining whether individual taxpayers are taking
improper deductions may be cumbersome. To ascertain whether indi-
viduals claimed improper tax deductions, "[e]very member of the club,
their guests, and any outside groups that used the club's facilities for
business purposes would need to be audited.""24 Club members assert
that interference with privacy through massive audits of club members
or prospective club members would greatly change the club environ-
ment and alter the very essence of a private club, whose members
"cherish their personal relationships, established after a painstaking
selection process."24 ' Moreover, they argue, the open discovery of club
membership lists would have a chilling effect on membership.24 Pres-
ent members would be discouraged from maintaining club membership
and new members would be reluctant to join.249 Furthermore, the risk
of a random tax audit based upon club membership would certainly
discourage prospective club members from joining the club.250 Few
individuals would relish submission to a tax audit simply because
of their membership in a private club.2 '
Since requests for club membership lists implicate individual
privacy rights, there must be a compelling state interest or specific
evidence of members' violations before a club should be required to
respond to a subpoena for a list of individual club members.252 Even
if the government has a compelling interest in discovering club mem-
bership lists, the state cannot access these lists if less intrusive means
are available for discovering illegal tax deductions.25
246. Rosner supra note 129, at 177. The process could take a year to straighten out
a single taxpayer. Holly Holland, Complaints Use New Law To Probe Private Clubs,
COURIER J., April, 19 1991, at 1A.
247. Pacific-Union Club v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco County, 283 Cal. Rptr. 287,296
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1976); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
463 (1958).
253. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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a. What is a Compelling State Interest in
Constitutionally Protected Club Membership Lists?
The right of intimate associational privacy is not absolute.
25 4
Where the State can demonstrate a compelling state interest in dis-
closure, a limited disclosure of constitutionally protected membership
lists in private clubs is permitted.2 5 No doubt the State has a compel-
ling interest in combating discrimination.256 Moreover, the fair admin-
istration of tax laws is likely also a compelling state interest. The State
may further these interests by disallowing tax deductions by private
club members if they subsidize discrimination. However, any compel-
ling interest in combating discrimination and avoiding subsidizing
it through tax deductions should not permit the government to engage
in random, mass tax audits of individual club members merely be-
cause they belong to a private club.
The California Court of Appeal's decision in Pacific- Union Club v.
Superior Court of San Francisco County is instructive when setting
limits as to how far the government should go in subpoenaing private
club membership lists for purposes of prohibiting tax deductions and
conducting tax audits.257 The California Franchise Tax Board peti-
tioned the court for the enforcement of an administrative subpoena
duces tecum for the membership list, names, addresses, and social
security numbers of the members of the private Pacific Union Club. 8
The purpose of the subpoena was to assure that members of an alleg-
edly discriminatory club were not taking illegal tax deductions.259
The Board admitted during oral arguments that it had no information
concerning any illegal deductions by members:
We [need] to determine the audit pool to find out whether or not
any member of the Club has violated the regulations. It is the only
way we have of determining who the members are.., at this
time we do not have any information - specific information about
whether any specific member is in violation of the regulations.260
The club objected to the request for the private membership list,
arguing that the request for the membership list and personal informa-
tion about club members violated the members' First and Fourteenth
254. Pacific-Union Club v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco, 283 Cal. Rptr. 287, 297 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
257. 283 Cal. Rptr. 287, 297-300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
258. Id. at 290.
259. Id. at 288.
260. Id. at 290.
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Amendment right to freedom of association "without unwarranted
governmental intervention or interference." '261 After establishing itself
as a purely private, intimate association, whose primary function was
to facilitate camaraderie between members,6 2 the club argued that dis-
closure of the membership list would put this intimate association
with members at risk.263
The court agreed that the membership lists were constitutionally
protected and concluded that in the absence of a compelling state inter-
est, the clubs were not required to disclose their membership lists.
264
Absent a "particularized need or specific relationship to a precise, sus-
pected act of wrongdoing," the court found no "compelling state in-
terest sufficient to overcome the right of privacy. ' 265 The court then
determined what a "particularized need or specific relationship to a
precise, suspected act of wrongdoing," means for purposes of disclos-
ing private club membership lists that result in taxpayer audits.266
Much of the evidence in Pacific Union focused upon the club itself
rather than upon any act of wrongdoing by individual club members
or a particularized complaint of discrimination-by any individual.267
The club provided evidence that it prohibited members from conduct-
ing business transactions on the premises and sent members monthly
statements as reminders that deductions for club expenses were
illegal.2 8 The club conceded that it discriminated on the basis of age.269
The club also had a general reputation in the community for exclud-
ing women from membership.27 ° The court noted, however, that there
was no record evidence of gender discrimination from which to base
any state interest, except for a forty-year-old corporate exemption tax
application. 271 Additionally, the Franchise Tax Board did not have
any evidence of specific violations by individual members.272 The court
noted that "even if the Board had some information that a member
or a few members violated the regulations, it would still not be
permitted to violate the constitutional rights of the hundreds of
261. Id. at 292.
262. Id. at 294.
263. Pacific-Union Club, 283 Cal Rptr. at 296.
264. Id. at 297.
265. Id. at 299.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 289-90.
268. Id. at 290.
269. The club required all prospective members to be at least twenty-five years old.
Pacific- Union Club, 283 Cal Rptr. at 289.
270. Id.
271. Id. The exemption application defined its membership qualifications as "[a]ny
male over 25 years of age approved by the current members." Id.
272. Id.
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other innocent members." '273 Thus, the court held that mass audits
of individual club members would be nothing more than a "fishing"
expedition.274
Under the Pacific Union analysis, a private club's general repu-
tation in the community for discrimination is insufficient to overcome
the privacy concerns of individual club members in regards to disclos-
ing club membership lists for tax audits.275 To access these lists, the
state must present evidence of specific wrongdoing by individuals.276
The Pacific Union analysis appears to require, at a minimum, a direct
allegation of discrimination, such as a complaint of discrimination in
club membership practices or services directed toward a member of an
otherwise protected class, and some knowledge of the individuals in-
volved in violating the tax regulations.277 It also appears that any sub-
sequent tax audit resulting from the disclosure would be limited to
those individuals suspected of violating the tax regulations, versus the
membership at large.27 ' Therefore, under the Pacific Union analysis
the state cannot establish a compelling interest in acquiring club mem-
bership lists. The government would have to raise any action taken to
deny tax benefits against the direct violator at the private club.
b. Are There Less Intrusive Means to End Tax Subsidies for
Discrimination at Private Clubs?
Less intrusive ways for the state to discover violators of the pro-
hibition on tax deductions for club-related activities may exist other
than collecting massive personal information about club members and
conducting audits at random.279 The state could require clubs to dis-
seminate information about illegal deductions in membership policies
and monthly statements. The state could audit specific groups who are
likely to be members of private clubs, such as wealthy males in cities
with clubs known to discriminate on the basis of race or gender. The
court in Pacific- Union suggested that it would be less intrusive to
audit wealthier males in the San Francisco area with certain profes-
sions or income levels, versus individual club members at random.2"
273. Id. at 299.
274. Id. at 298.
275. Pacific-Union Club, 283 Cal Rptr. at 289.
276. Id. at 298.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 299.
279. Id. at 299.
280. Id. Note that such an investigation of specific groups could create equal pro-
tection problems.
TEED OFF ABOUT PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMATION
Alternatively, the State Franchise Tax Board could "require attach-
ment of a [tax] schedule listing the names of all organizations to whom
the taxpayer has paid business expenses" for which he or she claims
a deduction.2"' These options may accomplish the same goal of ensur-
ing that state tax benefits do not support discriminatory practices.
Moreover, discovery involving illegal tax deductions could focus
on the private clubs themselves rather than upon random individual
taxpayers who are club members. One author suggests that the
government could discover information about businesses that pay
for dues, or other club benefits for employees through the use of inter-
rogatories directed to the club.282 An investigation would focus on busi-
ness entities and organizations without focusing upon individual
club members or divulging membership lists.
CONCLUSION
While bona fide private clubs have the right to discriminate
against individuals on any basis, they do not have the right to do so
on the taxpayer's dime. Even though private clubs are specifically
excluded from certain provisions of civil rights laws, they are still sub-
ject to some state and federal antidiscrimination laws. For example,
private clubs may be liable for discrimination against individuals
under employment law. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to question
whether private clubs that discriminate against individuals who
would otherwise be protected under civil rights laws should receive
government subsidization of discrimination through tax laws. Private
clubs are still subject to the investigative powers of state and federal
agencies for the limited purpose of determining whether they qualify
for government benefits and privileges such as liquor licenses and
tax privileges.
The problem, however, arises when the state or federal govern-
ment conducts an investigation or enforces the laws granting or deny-
ing government benefits and privileges against individual taxpayers.
Wholesale tax audits of individual members of private clubs, or even
discovery of individual names of club members, may have a chilling
effect on club membership and may violate members' freedom of inti-
mate association. The membership at large may not be engaged in
the discriminatory activity. Therefore, government agencies should
focus their inquiries in the following areas.
281. Id.
282. Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of
Antidiscrimination Laws to Quasi-Private Clubs, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 27, 81 n.189
(1994).
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First, when there is a particularized complaint of discrimination
by an individual, the investigation and enforcement should proceed
against the members involved in the discriminatory conduct, without
violating the constitutional rights of the membership as a whole. Mass
discovery of membership lists and mass audits of taxpayers would
not be required, as the offenders involved would likely be known by
the complainant.
Second, when there is direct evidence or statistical proof of dis-
crimination, the club itself may be denied government benefits or
privileges, such as property tax exemptions or liquor licenses, without
violating the associational rights of individual club members. The tax
savings could be substantial, given the non-profit status of most clubs
and the vast amount of valuable property, such as golf courses and
tennis courts, owned by many private clubs.
Moreover, if a private club claims tax exemptions and other gov-
ernment privileges, it should bear the burden of demonstrating that
it does not discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or religion. The
club could do so by publicly filing policies and statistics and indicating
on sales receipts whether the receipts qualify for preferential tax
treatment. It only makes sense to place the burden upon the entity
claiming a government benefit. Placing the burden upon government
agencies to prove discrimination at a private club through protracted
litigation and administrative hearings is incredibly cumbersome.
This increased burden is unjustified and defeats the laudable public
policy of preventing discrimination on the taxpayer's dime.
